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Abstract: Can humanism be post-colonial? What is Africana Philosophy? Who is Lewis 
Gordon? This paper presents some typical elements of the Jamaican philosopher Lewis 
Gordon’s thought and relates it to the field of Africana Philosophy. For this purpose, it seeks to 
delineate its theoretical influences and the usage of concepts, such as theodicy, bad faith and 
reason to understand anti-black racism. In this sense, the following argument pivots on Lewis 
Gordon’s singular contribution to different areas of study, especially political philosophy, 
social sciences and the humanities. 
Keywords: Lewis Gordon; Africana Philosophy; Post-colonial Humanism; Existential 
Phenomenology. 
Resumo: O humanismo pode ser pós-colonial? O que é a Filosofia Africana? Quem é Lewis 
Gordon? Este artigo apresenta alguns elementos típicos do pensamento do filósofo jamaicano 
Lewis Gordon e relaciona-o ao campo da Filosofia Africana. Para tanto, procura delinear suas 
influências teóricas e o uso de conceitos, como a teodiceia, a má-fé e a razão para entender o 
racismo anti-negro. Nesse sentido, argumenta-se em torno da contribuição singular de Lewis 
Gordon para diferentes áreas de estudo, especialmente filosofia política, ciências sociais e 
humanidades. 
Palavras-chave: Lewis Gordon; Filosofia Africana; Humanismo Pós-colonial; Fenomenologia 
Existencial. 
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Introduction: “Sometimes a gun is a gun” 
This chapter title, which could be translated as “Sometimes, a gun is (just) a gun”, is 
appropriate enough to introduce the presentation of Afro-Jewish Jamaican philosopher, 
political thinker, educator and musician, Lewis Ricardo Gordon. The above-referenced title, 
excerpted from his last book What Fanon said (2015), refers to Frantz Fanon’s critique of the 
book Psychologie de la colonization, from Lacanian psychologist Dominique Octave Mannoni 
(1950), when he reduces the real world to the possible meanings one may infer from it. 
Observing that Malagasies often had dreams of black bulls or armed Senegalese soldiers 
terrorizing them, Mannomi concluded these “phallic” nightmares were due to a psychic 
complex of inferiority, already existent among Madagascar island inhabitants before French 
colonization, which explained, therefore, a Malagasy colonial vocation.3.  
In response, Fanon dedicates an entire chapter to Mannomi, arguing that meanings 
should not be seen as explainable in themselves, but through concrete analyses of reality; in the 
Malagasy case, the systematic use of Senegalese soldiers by French colonial occupation forces 
in Madagascar Island. As Fanon explains while commenting on the related dreams: 
The enraged black bull is not the phallus. The two black men are not the two father 
figures—the one standing for the real father, the other for the primal ancestor. Here is 
what a thorough analysis could have found, on the same basis of M. Mannoni’s 
conclusions in his section, ‘The Cult of the Dead and the Family.’ The rifle of the 
Senegalese soldier is not a penis but a genuine rifle, model Lebel 1916. The black bull 
and the robber are not lolos—“reincarnated souls”—but actually the irruption of real 
fantasies into sleep (FANON, 2008:100). 
Lewis Gordon’s philosophical production arises in the wake of such a tradition, but, at 
the same time, it seeks its revision due to contemporary challenges of epistemic racism’s 
perpetuation. This philosopher, born in Jamaica Island and raised in the Bronx, New York, has 
even played jazz in nightclubs before graduating with a degree in philosophy and political 
                                                        
3This “Prospero complex”, reveals a latent feelings of inferiority and a desire for a (White) father to assume the 
place of the law. Citing Mannoni, Fanon claims that: “the ‘Prospero complex’ (is) defined as the sum of those 
unconscious neurotic tendencies that delineate at the same time the “picture” of the paternalist colonial and the 
portrait of ‘the racialist whose daughter has suffered an [imaginary] attempted rape at the hands of an inferior 
being.’ Prospero, as we know, is the main character of Shakespeare’s comedy, The Tempest. Opposite him we 
have his daughter, Miranda, and Caliban. Toward Caliban, Prospero assumes an attitude that is well known to 
Americans in the southern United States. Are they not forever saying that the niggers are just waiting for the 
chance to jump on white women?” (FANON, 2008, p. 80) 
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science and being inducted into the Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society. He also obtained a doctorate 
in philosophy from Yale University, advised by Maurice Natanson, a phenomenologist and 
follower of Alfred Schütz. 
In Gordon’s writings, phenomenology – especially from Husserl’s matrix – merges with 
critical race theory, existentialist sociology and the thought of Marx, Du Bois and Fanon, to 
compose what Nissim-Sabat calls “new postcolonial humanism” (NISSIM-SABAT, 2011 
include page). Therefore, Gordon seeks to correlate concrete as well as (inter)subjective aspects 
of social reality. Husserl’s influence is noticeable, since he frames phenomenology as 
investigatory method for contemporary reality. In Gordon’s view: 
Phenomenological appeals have the distinct advantage of recognizing intentional 
dimensions to human phenomena. They entail an appeal to the intersubjective 
foundations of meaning, to their constitutive features manifested in the realm of 
sociality. Moreover, like the textual appeals, phenomenological one’s afford a space 
for openness by suspending ontological commitments to the phenomena beyond their 
status as phenomena. (GORDON qtd. in NISSIM-SABAT, 2011, p. 43) 
Thus, the existential phenomenology proposed by Gordon allows for thinking about 
Sciences of the Spirit (Geisteswissenschaft) as a negotiation between existential interactions of 
individuals, people, and, in a more thorough picture, the trajectory of human community, 
without, nevertheless, taking this wholeness as fixed and/or aprioristic entities (NISSIM-
SABAT, 2011, p. 35). This means, as Nissim-Sabat argues, that Lewis Gordon’s 
phenomenology represents a commitment that is, at the same time, humanist, due to its radical 
concerns with post-colonial human emancipation and its refusal of racism and identity 
essentialisms. As we will see, it is from such a perspective that the philosopher presents anti-
black racism as well as black identity itself as self-deceptive expressions.  
1 But what is Africana Philosophy? 
Lewis Gordon establishes his discursive position from a thought tradition he calls 
Africana philosophy. It is well known that, in English, the nationality of someone from Africa 
is African and not Africana. In the US academy, for example, there are African studies, focusing 
on the study of African history and culture, and Black studies or African-American studies, 
focusing on the comprehension of black people’s reality in the United States. However, the 
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term Africana has a broader scope, since it encompasses, at once, studies about African people 
and their diaspora. Nonetheless, this field of study transcends the ostensible character of the 
field, for it presents itself as a transdisciplinary theoretical perspective committed to 
overcoming multiple manifestations of racism. To Gordon (2000, 2008), the roots of Africana 
self-reflection4are in Africa, but that philosophical positioning is not oriented by 
acknowledging or discovering an original identity that, supposedly, already existed before 
colonization, but by a collective identity assumedly posterior and in counterpoint to colonial 
sociability processes and products. 
The philosophical viability of such self-reflection, as argues the Jamaican philosopher, 
demands over coming western binarisms, such as past/present, reason/emotion, 
traditional/modern and, above all, thinking about the influence of past over present so that there 
are possibilities of reinterpreting this past from the perspective of present-time issues. From 
this prism, he faces the one and multiple issue stemming from Africana identity. In the past the 
African ancestors did not see themselves as “African” – just as Ionian and Spartan people did 
not see themselves as European – the term would only make sense from present 
resignifications5, which would allow him to talk about Africana Philosophy, so much as in 
European or Asian philosophy (GORDON, 2008) 
That said, Gordon argues that the main challenge Africana Philosophy faces is 
overcoming the racialization of “love for wisdom,” that is to say, its representation as 
essentially white/European (Ibid). Traditionally, and at present, professors teach students that 
philosophy was born in Greece and human reason developed more fully in Europe than in any 
part of the world. (MORE, 1996).Counterpointing this idea, the Jamaican philosopher relies on 
the works of Théophile Obenga (1992), Enrique Dussel (2000) and Martin Bernal (1987; 2001) 
to state that the term philosophy (Greek philia = fraternal love and sofia = wisdom) came from 
                                                        
4According to Husserl, “Phenomenology becomes ‘prime Philosophy’ by radical self-reflection, and also universal, 
because of that. On a plainly reflexive attitude, the philosopher observes ‘things’ in their original immediate and 
pure state, letting himself be guided exclusively by them. In such evincement attitude, he is able to describe what 
is immediately given to conscience. (ZILLES, 2012: 23, my emphasis) 
5This position held by Gordon seems to be different than a more nativist view, such as the one adopted by Cheikh 
Anta Diop (2014), Magobo More (1996) and Eduardo David Oliveira (2003), as well as a view more critical of 
identity essentialisms, as in Kwama Anthony Appiah (1992). 
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KMT (Egypt)6and that Greek philosophy itself could only develop as such from its exchange 
of knowledge with civilizations around it7. 
Therefore, to Gordon (1995a; 2008), the idea of an ancient Greek creator of philosophy 
is an invention - bad faith8-in the philosopher’s terms – made up in fifteenth-century in Europe 
during the Renaissance. This is a moment in which European Man discovered himself as a 
subject of history, beginning to represent himself as the core and measure of each and every 
entity. Before that, warns Gordon, India was considered the center of the world and Europe was 
only its West (Ibid),. However, the race to India, the Christian Reconqueston the Iberian 
Peninsula after Moorish dominion, Christopher Columbus’s arrival in Bahamas, as well as the 
very development of productive forces in Europe, which contributed to the rise of“new” focus 
on Europe as a specific geopolitical and historic territory and as its intellectual center 
(GORDON, 2008, p. 05, insert page; ROBINSON, 2001, p. 33). If White is presented as 
universal human expression, Black may only be the other pole: distance and/or a threat to this 
(pseudo) universal humanity. 
For this reason, Gordon contends that Africana philosophy’s developmental pattern is 
better viewed in the context of colonization, or, in other words, as a counterpoint to it. However, 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, figures such as Olaudah Equiano (1745 – 1797), 
Ottobah Cugoano (1757 – 1791), Frederick Douglass (1818 – 1895), Harriet Jacobs (1813 – 
1897), Mary Prince (1788 – 1899) and David Walker (1796 – 1830), made themselves heard 
                                                        
6Molefe Asante presents this question as follows: “literally, Philosophy ‘would be’ a Greek word, from ‘Philo’, 
which means brother or lover; and ‘Sophia’, that means wisdom or wise. Therefore, a philosopher is called “a 
friend of wisdom”. Nevertheless, the origin of the term – ‘Sophia’ – clearly comes from an African language 
(MduNtr), that was ancient Egypt language, where the word “Seba”, that means ‘wise’, figures, for the first time, 
in 2052 BC, in the tomb of Antef I (that is, much before the existence of Greece or Greek). So the word became 
‘Sebo’ in Coptic, and ‘Sophia’ in Greek. In the term Philosophy – the lover of wisdom – there is precisely ‘Seba’, 
that is the same as ‘wise’, as provable from writings found in very old Egyptian tombs”.(ASANTE, 2015) 
7About the relation of philosophical exchange between Africa and Europe, see also “Afrique en dialogue, Afrique 
en auto-questionnement: universalisme ou provincialisme? Compromis d’Atlantou initiative historique?”, from 
Nkolo Foe (2013). 
8Relatively distinct from the common sense meaning of “bad faith”, interpreting it as a lie told on purpose to 
others. Sartre specifies that, “The situation cannot be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie 
to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing 
untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that 
in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth” (SARTRE, 1953) 
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by presenting political and theoretical challenges to such negation of black humanity and 
assuming an Africana perspective. In the twentieth century, according to Gordon, this task was 
taken up by activist intellectuals like Marcus Garvey (1887 – 1940), Ida B. Wells (1862 – 1931), 
W. E. B. DuBois (1868 – 1963), Alain Locke (1885 – 1954), Frantz Fanon (1925 – 1961), 
Wilson Harris (1921 - ) Sylvia Wynter (1928 - ), among others, whose voices still echo in 
contemporary anti-racist literature. 
In his An Introduction to Africana Philosophy (2008), Gordon lists hundreds of thinkers 
whose works may be framed in this field or from this perspective. Yet, still evident is the 
absence of important Afro-diasporic thinkers located in South America, or even lesser known 
African from the Hispanophone and Lusophone universe – such as MicaelaBastidasPuyucahua 
(1745 – 1781), José Manuel Valdez (1767 – 1843), Luiz Gama (1830 – 1882), Machado de 
Assis (1839 – 1908), Guerreiro Ramos (1915 – 1982), Abdias do Nascimento (1914 – 2011), 
Lélia Gonzalez (1935 – 1994), Victoria Santa Cruz (1922 – 2014), VirgíniaBicudo (1919 – 
2003), Amilcar Cabral (1924 – 1973), Mario Pinto de Andrade (1928 – 1990) and others. The 
purpose of his selection is to ascertain that the elements that reflect this perspective were already 
present centuries before the term Africana was formulated.  
The other side of Africana, or Gordonian, self-reflection is that, if racism – especially 
anti-black racism – is a western expression of bad faith9, cultural, political and theoretical 
movements that oppose it would be at risk of incurring self-deceit. Just like Frantz Fanon, the 
author acknowledges the capital importance of various movements towards the affirmation of 
undervalued identities. But Gordon is aware of the risks that their repetition - even conversely 
and in a subversive political way –present an escape from themselves – from their responsibility 
with their own freedom – that characterizes bad faith. 
Gordon (1995a, 1995b, 1997), in frank dialogue with Sartre, views “absolute freedom”, 
as subject structural indetermination; the enforceability of choosing and having to face the 
consequences of his/her own choices and the insurmountable contingency of the world to create 
                                                        
9Bad Faith works for the benefit of White supremacy as a form of self-deceit that allows for the self-assurance of 
Europeans and their descendants – but also solidifies the assumptions of capital civilization – as unquestionably 
sovereign. 
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an almost unbearable anguish – nausea.10To escape from this reality – this obligation of 
choosing – and redress such anguish on the surface, we create a kind of enclosed ego that 
deludes us into assuming some role: father, doctor, philosopher or other identities. For Sartre, 
Fanon and Gordon, bad faith is a symbolic escape of an unpleasant reality through a projection 
that alleviates existence. The specifically Africana concern for Gordon is that black identity, 
even in its radical uncovering of anti-black bad faith, does not escape the traps of self-deceit. 
Therefore, to Gordon, Black does not exist – in itself – unless it projects an ego that seeks 
protection from anti-black attacks. The problem turns up when it is forgotten and this identity 
projection is taken as ontologically true (HENRY, 2006, p. 16).  
The Antiguan-born philosopher Paget Henry, systematizes the development of the 
phenomenological tradition in Africana Philosophyby suggesting the existence of three 
important “chapters”11.The first, “written” by the African American sociologist, historian, and 
philosopher of existence W.E.B. Du Bois, consists of a black revision of Hegelian dialectics 
through the metaphor of Lord and Bondsman to illustrate the challenges of double 
consciousness in a racist society. However, instead of Hegel, who thinks of wholeness as a 
synonym for Europe, or Europe as expression of universality, Du Bois thinks of these categories 
                                                        
10Different from Fanon, for whom “nausea” is the bad feeling of not being recognized, in Gordon it comes closer 
to the Sartrean idea of the anguish of a self-reflexive subject facing the absolute contingency of existence.It occurs 
that such phenomena, for both, the tense relations between “Self” and the “other” pass through an objectification 
of perspective that converts another’s “for itself” into an “in itself” for, the “Self” resulting, not rarely, in violence 
from such objectification. 
11Gordon himself, while recounting this trajectory, includes the African American feminist thinker Anna Julia 
Cooper (1858 – 1964) as a pioneer of this phenomenological approach. The daughter of a slave who married the 
“lord”, she had access, in the nineteenth century, to basic schooling and university, having become a teacher. She 
got her PhD in Comparative Literature, at the Sorbonne, with a thesis about Haitian Revolution entitled L’Attitude 
de la France a l’égard de l’esclavage pendant la Révolution. Cooper was also one of the organizers of the fist 
Pan-African Congress, in 1901, in London, and one of the pioneers of what is now referred to as black feminist 
thought. Her theoretical productions question meritocracy in education, starting from a reflection on the places 
and opportunities available to black men and women, as well as their impact on the educational performance of 
individuals. Gordon sums up Cooper’s argument as follows: “The antiblack racist argument is that the absence of 
black contribution to civilization suggests that humankind could do well without people. Cooper’s response was 
that worth was a function of what an individual produced in relation to that which was invested in him or her. She 
pointed out that very little was invested in blacks, and even less in black women. Yet what blacks have produced 
is enormous. There is not only the slave labor used to build much of the Americas, but also the innovations and 
strides of black communities under enormously handicapped conditions” (2008, p. 71). 
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as globally complementary, encompassing other non-European sociabilities and, in so doing, 
breaks with Hegel (Ibid.). 
Africana Philosophy’s second chapter – to Henry  and the third, to Gordon – may be 
productions of Caribbean Psychiatrist Frantz Fanon(Ibid.), pointing out that ontogeny, as 
philosophical self-reflection directed inwards to the subject, must be completed by sociogeny: 
perception of the influence of economic and social realities on individual choices. In Fanon’s 
words: 
Before beginning the case, I have to say certain things. The analysis that I am 
undertaking is psychological. In spite of this it is apparent to me that the effective 
disalienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition of social and economic 
realities. If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process: 
—primarily, economic; 
—subsequently, the internalization—or, better, the epidermalization— of this 
inferiority. 
Reacting against the constitutionalist tendency of the late nineteenth century, Freud 
insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis. He 
substituted for a phylogenetic theory the ontogenetic perspective. It will be seen that 
the black man’s alienation is not an individual question. 
Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny. In one sense, conforming to the view 
of Leconte and Damey, let us say that this is a question of a sociodiagnostic. 
What is the prognosis? But society, unlike biochemical processes, cannot escape human 
influences. Man is what brings society into being. (FANON, 2008, p. 4) 
 
Henry (2006) and Gordon (2008) agree that accepting ontogenyas incompleteness does 
not mean its withdrawal, but a clamor for its complement to other dimensions of our existence. 
Fanon’s main contribution, in their view, is pointing that Africana conscience and self-
constituent powers must be dialectically completed and verified by formative powers of 
sociocultural orders. More importantly, both philosophers hold that Africana people’s 
desalination, about which Fanon speaks, would propose implosion not only of anti-black 
racism, but also, and above all, the caricatures created by it, making the subjects face their real 
existential indetermination, what Fanon defined as zone of non-being. 12 (GORDON, 2005, p. 
3).  
                                                        
12In Black Skin, White Masks, we find two distinct features of the expression “non-being.” The first one, implicit 
throughout the text, supposes the denial of black people’s humanity, for the Being, as entity, is always white, and 
the black, in binary opposition, is the non-being. However, there is a second feature, with a phenomenological 
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Furthermore, Lewis Gordon (2008) enumerates a series of other Fanonian contributions 
to Africana Philosophy. Among them, the development of an anticolonial philosophy that is, at 
the same time, a questioning of colonialism, philosophy and reason. For him it is even ironic to 
present Fanon as a contributor tophilosophy – since philosophy is the reign of reason – as he 
himself had already warned that reason always found a way of taking off when he entered the 
room. Nevertheless, we will see that Fanon’s philosophical position is understood by Gordon 
as a “teleological suspension of Philosophy”13 (2008: 82), because it does not present acounter 
point to reason, but at least removes it from its pedestal, releasing it from its absolutizing and 
instrumental fetishes. Therefore, Fanonian philosophy, to Gordon, points to the Kierkegaardian 
worry about transcending philosophy’s own deontological biases. 
This lenghty description of the Fanonian approach is important to this paper’s focus, 
because it decisively marks Lewis Gordon’s thought, even though it is possible to identify some 
                                                        
slant, that just assumes the prior existential vagueness that, it believes, characterizes human being, which is the 
“zone of non-being”. Fanon declares: “There is a zone of non-being, an extraordinary sterile and arid region, where 
black is not a man, and mankind is digging into its own flesh to find meaning. Most black people do not enjoy the 
benefit of performing this descentto true Hell” (FANON, 2008, p. 158). 
 
13The term “teleological suspension” addresses the Danish philosopher Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-1855), in 
his search to problematize ethics limits. In Fear and Trembling, under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio, 
Kierkegaard takes back the biblical metaphor of Abraham in his intent to “sacrifice” his beloved child Isaac, 
obeying divine orders. Following God’s orders, Abraham goes against human ethics that urges parents to love and 
protect their children more than themselves. If he did otherwise, however, Abraham would be questioning God’s 
orders, which are above any human comprehension. As is well known, in this mythology, the parent proves his 
unrestrained faith by preparing the murder that does not consummate only because an angel, God’s messenger, 
keeps him from doing it. Analyzing Abraham’s case and stating that “his pain is his safety” (1979:275), 
Kierkegaard suggests that, differently from tragic Heroes - referring to classical tragedies - Who kill on behalf of 
the collective, the nation and ethics, the absurd – the faith – fact that Abraham lives marks him asan individual 
who transcends ethics, in obeisance of something above the collective, stepping out, in this way, from the finite 
towards infinite – the absolute.The interesting point for Gordon here is that philosophy, just like ethics, are 
parameters of world comprehension, with strains imposed by human history and geography and, thus, both cannot 
be thought as absolute entities. There are moments when the act of knowing demands a “teleological suspension” 
of philosophy, as he states: "By that, I mean that the kind of reason Fanon was fighting against led its practitioners 
to believe in its absoluteness. When Philosophy becomes absolute or ‘‘deontological,” it loses its own sense of 
purpose and becomes, like the universal in Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, below the realm of faith. 
Since an absolute is higher than a universal, that form of reasoning collapses upon itself by attempting to become 
greater than itself. However, such an attempt would be teleological, and in Kierkegaard’s case, the teleological 
movement involves reaching out to God. Ironically, such reaching out brings one back to the ethical, since God is 
not evil, and in this sense, one has ironically become more ethical by being willing to transcend ethics for its own 
sake. Fanon understood that philosophy could best be salvaged by our willingness to transcend it" (GORDON, 
2008: 82). 
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important differences between them. In this regard, Paget Henry (2006) argues that the authors 
come closer to Sartre’s influence, visible in the effort to philosophically approach ego and 
conscience, but they are different since the psychoanalyst Fanon focuses on the ego, while the 
professional philosopher Gordon, focuses on conscience and, in so doing, offers a larger 
systematization of Africana phenomenological philosophical bases. Thereafter, continues 
Henry, Fanon defines human reality as an ego wish, that is to say, a need towards the world, 
while Gordon defines human reality as freedom, with no a priori law, neither desire, as Fanon 
suggests, would determine this. 
Therefore, to Henry, Gordon’s originality – whom he conceives as the third cornerstone 
of Africana Philosophy – offers a larger systematization of that tradition and in the 
phenomenological analysis of the “state of being black” in the “post-colonial age”14. 
2 Theodicy 
One of Gordon’s most interesting contributions to contemporary philosophy lies in his 
operationalization of the old notion of “theodicy” which he names theodicean rationalizations. 
The term theodicy has its origins in Greek “theós” (θεός = God) and “díkē" (δίκη = Justice), 
which means, literally, “God’s justice”. Theodicean rationalizations, to Gordon (2008, 2014, 
2015), reach their apex in the answers of the African philosopher Augustine of Hipona.15The 
                                                        
14In this passage, the author uses the termspost-colonial and post-segregation era in a temporal sense, as a 
synonym of post-independencies period. See Henry (2006: 15) 
15 Hippo (latin Hippo Regius), where Augustine of Hippo (Saint Augustine) was born, was the name of present 
Annaba city, in Algeria. The son of a Roman father (Patricius) and Berber mother (Monica), Augustine had never 
left the African continent. What is relevant to Gordon is the extent that, in his view, the West itself can’t be 
explained if not by the relation it establishes with that which was conveyed as external to it: “[...] some thoughts 
on St. Augustine’s African location should strengthen the critique of not-out-of- Africa theses, which is a subtext 
of this book in general and chapter in particular. St. Aurelius Augustine was the son of a Roman father (Patricius) 
and a Berber mother (Monica). By now the reader should notice that ‘‘Berber” people are usually evoked in the 
north African context as a way of referring to Africa without outright saying black Africa. The term often refers 
to almost any indigenous, nomadic group of Africans who happen to be in north Africa. The Berbers of today do 
not necessarily look like the Berbers of nearly two millennia ago, and as our discussion in our introduction showed, 
it is an error to look at the people of any region as morphologically and culturally static and homogeneous when 
the region has been undergoing conquest and colonization for thousands of years. In the case of north Africa the 
populations have been affected by waves of European and West Asian conquest and colonization in antiquity by 
Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, a Visigoth and then Islamic Arabic onslaught in the Middle Ages, and then, in 
modern times since the defeat of the Moors in Iberia Peninsula in 1492, the Spanish, French, and Italians. St. 
Augustine is exclusively Roman Christian only through a logic that denies mixture, where he supposedly cannot 
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famous Saint Augustine presents the following trilemma of evil16, known as the Paradox of 
Epicure: If God is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent, why, then, does he not end the evil 
of the world? If He does not, it is because He cannot. Even wishing for its end, He is not 
omnipotent. If He does not do it, it is because he does not know about its existence, thus He is 
not omniscient. If He knows, in His omniscience and could end it in His omnipotence, but still 
does not do so, He is not benevolent. The justification for God’s existence, before the issue of 
evil, is, therefore, theodicy. 
The paradox above intensifies when the Judeo-Christian motto – that is, the idea that 
He is in everything that exists – adds to it. If it is so and still true that evil exists, would He also 
be there, in that which stands in opposition to goodness? Would evil be part of God or God part 
of evil, once He is in everything? The theodicy of St. Augustine is an exemplar:   
And I enquired what iniquity should be:but I found it not to be a substance, but a serving 
merely of the will crooked quite away from thee, O God (who art the supreme 
substance) towards these lower things, casting away its inward parts and and puffed up 
outwardly.(AUGUSTINE, book seven, chap. XVI, 1912) 
According to St. Augustine, the answer to the Paradox of Epicure would be in the fact 
that God did not create evil, neither the former nor the latter composes the divine system – 
which consists in unstrained goodness. Instead, it resides on a (free) will that corrupts itself by 
choosing to step away from Him. In other words, to Augustine, “evil occurs when somebody 
takes actions that take them away from God, away from goodness – that is, towards destruction” 
(KIESPELL, 2014). This is the issue of interest to Lewis Gordon (2008) for explaining modern 
western theodicy: if God is infinitely good and perfect, evil and corruption are only 
recognizable – when so they are – as a threat to or a distancing from Him, something outside 
God, never part of Him. So, western theodicean rationalization works as an ideological 
mechanism of self-deceit – which Gordon (1995a, 1997) labels as bad faith – that falsely 
                                                        
be Roman and Berber, a product of two sides of the Mediterranean. Nearly all of the philosophers we have 
examined are products of more than one civilization and more than one kind of people”(GORDON, 2008: 188-9).  
16It consists in a difficult choice among three options, any of them apparently unacceptable or unfavorable to the 
other. 
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transfers all the system’s contradictions, such as evil, corruption, violence, rapine, outwards – 
presenting itself as perfect and these features as aberrations. 
Gordon (2008) insists that, with theodicy’s secularization, argument legitimation starts 
becomes full filled through other political systems, like modern science and the forms of 
rationalization it offers. Such a grammar of rationalization and legitimation, constituent of a 
secularized theodicy, was the centerpiece, not only of European absolute State, but also of 
colonization itself.  
The formation of such systems and their theodicean rationalizations leads to the 
construction of insiders and outsiders. The ‘‘outside” is an invisible reality generated, 
in its invisibility, as nonexistent. The effect, then, is that a new link with theodicy 
emerges and the result is the rationalization of people who are inherently justified 
versus those who are not necessarily people and thus could never be justified under the 
principles of the systems that form both. The result is, as Du Bois famously observed, 
the splitting of worlds and consciousness itself according to the norms of US society 
and its contradictions (GORDON, 2008, p. 77) 
In the rise of modern society, when the idea of human being as a measure of everything 
(theodicy), that is, the self built by reason, the black and many Others expelled from western 
theodicy, are not only distant, but also and above all tension and threaten such (pseudo) 
humanity, therefore they need to be watched, punished, trained or even exterminated. However, 
it is not only a question of banning them from western “paradise” by creating an ontological 
separation between the Euro-American “us” and “them” from the Global South, but mainly by 
imposing on “them” all those contradictions that are also “ours”, dispensing the Euro-American 
us from any and all responsibility for what only exists due to their own choices. 
The Sartrean concept of bad faith is also used to explain the divination of the White 
world.17 Gordon uses the works of Mignolo (2003), Robinson (2001) and Dussel (2003) to 
argue that racism had its genesis in the early modern age, through Indigenous genocide and 
African slavery, in addition to the spreading of stereo types about slaves as decayed beings or 
                                                        
17In his Bad Faith and Anti-black Racism, Gordon states: “Examining racism from the standpoint of Sartrean 
philosophy of existence isn't a new idea. Jean-Paul Sartre has explored racial concerns in some of his work from 
the 1940s, and early 1950s, such as Anti-Semite and Jew, Notebooks for Ethics, The Respectful Prostitute, Black 
Orpheus, and Black Presence. The virtues and vices of Anti-Semite and Jews have received study, but anti-black 
racism from the standpoint of bad faith has received relatively cursory and quite inadequate attention” (GORDON, 
1995, p. 3). 
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non-beings. This view was useful for modern capitalist consolidation, to the extent that it 
created and spread the fantasy that colonial power had no limits. Since then, capitalist expansion 
has been inextricable to the slaughter and negation of the other. In this sense, bad faith has 
become the modus operandi of the capitalist conscience (NISSIM-SABAT, 2011). 
Therefore in western theodicy, the White/European/Western subject that he  dismissed 
his own contradictions. He/she has acquired sacred status, playing the role of the incarnation of 
goodness, beauty and absolute truth and presenting him/herself as the standard of reality, 
humanity and universality. The Black, in his turn, when presented, plays the role of disgraced 
opposition, never conceived as human. Because of this, philosophy, science and social thought 
produced by blacks need not be considered thought per se. If what expresses humanity, in 
Europe, is reason, and the black is not human, he could not be considered a knowledge producer. 
Hence, Gordon’s outrage is justified when Hannah Arendt (1969) criticizes Fanon’s The 
Wretched of the Earth, derogatorily naming Fanon as apologist of violence. Gordon (2014, 
2015) considers that Arend thad not even read the book, but only criticized it based on the 
preface, written by the white philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Arendt’s racism turned up in her criticism in On Violence. In fact she spent more time 
with Sartre than Fanon. Why? Indeed, she considered the white man as the place of 
genuine thought. If she had read Fanon, she would have realized they had much more 
in common. For example, both believed in politics, in distinction between will in 
general and general will (in Rousseau’s way), in distinction between force and 
legitimate violence, in the issue of human dignity and much more. However, her 
eurocentrism prevailed. Moreover, which is worse, she had such a racism that she could 
see herself more worried about Boers becoming similar to South African native 
population than about the fact they were colonizing18(GORDON, 2014). 
Nevertheless, in this bad faith movement that sees White as a coherent entity, Black 
will not be the only one alienated from his humanity, but the White himself – or even western 
thought – only presents itself by hiding one part of itself – the one it can only see in the Other. 
Thus, its relation with this logic is based on a constant meeting with a false universal. Gordon 
                                                        
18In the following excerpt, Gordon (2014) has harsh words for the author: “Arendt simply lacked the ability to see 
European civilization bearers as violent, even in the wake of Holocaust. Fanon, however, was among those soldiers 
who freed the ungrateful prisoners from the concentration fields (ungrateful bexause they would have preferred, 
in some cases, to  be freed by white people), among those who were working in solidarity with the Arabs  who 
hated blacks, working through struggles even against domestic abuses (a subject I discuss in my book What Fanon 
Said): he looked to the core of violence issue as a peculiarly social transformation of force and brutality”. 
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(2006, 2008) states that it means the black world links itself to the truth more than the white 
world, because its perceptual domain, over which allegations of truth may recur, is much wider 
than the white world, as (false) universal, is able to admit. 
Lewis Gordon (2014) argues that theodicean rationalization is not limited to political 
identities, dwelling on the very modern notions of philosophy and science, when these are seen 
as absolute. Furthermore, according to him, one of Frantz Fanon’s and W.E.B Du Bois’ main 
contributions was the “teleological suspension of Philosophy”.19The same criticisms, of 
philosophy – as well as reason in general and science in particular –can be extended to the 
classic theorists of the social sciences, widely referenced by Gordon, such as Marx, Sartre, 
Husserl, Heidegger, Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida, among others. When certain theories or 
theorists are cited by critics, we act as if they are omniscient deities: “therefore, racism, sexism, 
homophobia, classism and all forms of humanity degradation we read in the texts become just 
a failure in how we read them” (GORDON, Ibid.).  
However, warns Gordon, critics of classical theodicy is not a call for not reading them, 
but for doing it considering their contribution and limits. 
[...] It is a mistake to infer that by pointing to the fact that these are elements in texts 
written by human beings is a call not to read them. I sustain that it is false. Denouncing 
theodicy in texts means rejecting such an approach. It is a call to really reading the 
texts. This means bringing to the foreground the humanness of the authors. It means 
admitting they are not perfect texts, but have human imperfections.(GORDON, 2014). 
3 Reason, modern age and colonialism 
According to Lewis Gordon (1995b, 2008, 2014, 2015), Frantz Fanon’s writings were 
guided by the challenge of freedom and restrictions imposed on it in modern world. On this 
discursive route, the issue of reason, and constant efforts to take it as an absolute entity, is faced. 
Due to Husserl’s (1982) and Kierkegaard’s (1983) influence, the western usage of reason is 
                                                        
19See note 14.  
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often considered as self-deceit. Gordon, in his turn, states that when reason – or philosophy – 
becomes absolute, it loses its own purpose. 
Colonization of reason is aspiration to instrumental rationality. The idea is that 
reason does not always “behave well”. As which also evaluates rationality, a 
question comes up: Is reason rational? Reason, I sustain, as something that 
evaluates even itself, must go beyond itself and, therefore, is not ultimately 
consistent. The effort to reach supreme rationality engenders colonization of 
reason. However, as we know, “it” continues to be challenging (GORDON, 
2014).  
Yet the problem posed by Fanon, as Gordon argues, is even graver. Firstly, as seen 
before, western theodicy consists in reducing humanity to reason and, after that, in naming the 
European – or the White – as the universal expression of humanity. Therefore, White is seen as 
inherently rational and Black, its opposite, that is, an irrational animal. However, reason – 
already strained by colonial alienation – is often used in favor of white supremacy. In L’an V 
de la Révolution Algérienne (1959), Fanon offers many examples of how colonialism drew 
upon reason to impose its domain over people considered irrational. Briefly, in colonialism, not 
only is God presented as a white man, but reason itself (deified) operates as witness to the 
superiority of some over others. 
There is, in this colonial movement, sort of a geographical centering of reason, that is 
expressed in its reduction to western historical manifestations and by the (pseudo) 
universalization of European subject as well, which begins to figure as universal expression of 
humanness (HENRY, 2006). Gordon (2006) contends that even European phenomenology – in 
which Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl are remarkable –I critiques different forms of self-
deceit that ended up reproducing a self-reflexive practice that presents the latent movements of 
a universal reason inside the core of European subject. Nonetheless, for him, modern racism 
and Eurocentrism born from that are not expressions of reason, but of its eclipse instead. 
For I am not so much anti-modern as I am anti Eurocentrism. There are elements of 
modernity that I avow and elements that I reject. To reject Eurocentrism is not identical 
to rejecting European civilization in toto or rejecting modernity, and it is a seriously 
racist form of reasoning that would make white people the only bearers of a modern 
consciousness. One would have to conclude, in effect, that black people are incapable 
of being modern or developing their own forms of modernity or alternatives beyond 
pre-modernity, modernity (GORDON, 1997, p. 102).  
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In this sense, he maintains that the paradox Fanon faced denounced racist reason 
without, meanwhile occurring in non-reason. That is, it pointed to the collapse of rationality in 
western rationality or in the White, but not to reason itself: 
Black Skin, White Masks is, therefore, like Dante’s Inferno, which ends after a 
seemingly endless journey of witnessing sinful practices of futility with a beautiful 
ascent that bears witness to the stars, a patently optimistic text despite its motif of 
failure.The performative contradiction of pessimism is the work itself. Fanon 
ultimately criticizes the collapse of rationality into Western or White rationality. The 
text itself—an effort to reason with the reader—is a verdict against irrationalism, 
although it is not a wholesale endorsement of rationalism. Too much rationalism is, 
after all, irrational. It is at least unreasonable. (GORDON, 2015, p. 59) 
The term “new postcolonial humanism” forged by Nissim-Sabat (2011) to describe 
Lewis Gordon’s work, may seem strange from the perspective used in the dichotomy between 
illuminist reason perspectives, in their assurance of a self-centered subject; and the group of 
post-structuralist perspectives, in their frontal critique to closed identity and reason notions. 
From this position, I will remark here on British post-colonial thought20. However, it seems that 
Gordon’s philosophical enterprise is precisely the overcoming of this dichotomy, based, at 
once, on a radical critique of colonialism – seen as part of the modern age and not its antithesis 
– and on the de-racialization and vindication of rational self-reflection procedures from 
deviating established, Eurocentric geographies of reason. 
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